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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
WILLIAM D. WARREN*
In the field of Criminal Law and Procedure, the Tennessee Supreme
Court might be said to have completed a normal, even typical, year;
some new law was announced, and much existing law was reiterated
and reshaped. The Court's respect for local precedent persisted un-
diminished. No Tennessee case was directly overruled, and Tennessee
precedents were closely adhered to when available. Not a single dis-
sent appeared in the cases discussed in this article.
The brevity of appellate opinions -particularly their highly con-
densed fact paragraphs -makes critical analysis of them a difficult
and somewhat risky procedure. Nevertheless, an attempt has been
made in this article to add the analytical dimension to the descriptive
one. Although one might like a somewhat more detailed treatment in
some of the opinions, the holdings of the Court in this field -most of
them written by Judge Prewitt - were usually sensible and desirable.'
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Homicide: It should be of interest to Tennessee lawyers to note that
the doctrine of Keller v. State,2 with its unusually onerous burden of
responsibility on the intoxicated driver, still has vigor in this State.
In that well-known decision, the Court held that driving an auto-
mobile while intoxicated is an act malum in se and that, when one is
killed by an auto driven by one in the commission of an act malum,
in se, the driver is guilty of a homicide without any showing of a
causal connection between the death and the driver's wrongful act.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt, University
1. Several Criminal Law cases not appearing in this article are treated in
other articles in this Survey. Hicks v. State, 250 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. 1952), is
found in the Possession section of the article on Personal Property and Sales.
Murphy v. State, 254 S.W.2d 979 (Tenn. 1953), and Monroe v. State, 253 S.W.2d
734 (Tenn. 1952), are discussed in the Evidence section of the Procedure
and Evidence article. Manning v. State, 257 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1953), is discussed
in the Trial section of the Procedure and Evidence article. Allen v. State, 250
S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. 1952), and Helton v. State, 250 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1952), are
covered by the Appeal and Error topic of the Procedure and Evidence article.
2. 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R. 685 (1927), 41 HARV. L. REV. 669
(1928).
3. A recent restatement of the rule appeared in Whitlock v. State, 187 Tenn.
522, 525, 216 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1948): "Suffice it to say that if the act which
causes death is Malum in se, the criminal intent is supplied, and it is not
necessary that it be shown that death was the natural and probable result of
the act." The lack of any definite standard of which acts are malum in se
and which are malum prohibitum makes such a rule necessarily an arbitrary
and undesirable one. In Holder v. State, 152 Tenn. 390, 277 S.W. 900 (1925),
the Court held that carrying a pistol in violation of a statute was an act
malum prohibitum. Driving an auto in excess of the speed limit was also held
1179
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Despite the Court's insistence that "There is nothing radical or novel
in this conclusion, ' 4 the case has become standard fare in several of
the nation's Criminal Law casebooks5 as being one of the most ex-
treme holdings in this area of law.
The Keller decision finds its latest adherence in Davis v. State,
where a driver, shown by the evidence to be drunk, killed a pedestrian.
In answer to the defendant's contention that the evidence prepon-
derated against the verdict, the Court held that the conviction of
involuntary manslaughter could be sustained on either one of two
theories. One theory was that the defendant was driving while in-
toxicated and was thus, under the Keller rule, in the commission of an
act malum in se and responsible for the death which resulted.
Causation was again a factor in Gray v. Smith,7 where a post-crap
game melee, occasioned by the game's breaking up while the defen-
dant was still a loser, resulted in the defendant shooting three of the
other participants. Two survived, but one, though suffering only from
flesh wounds not thought to be fatal, died of uremic poisoning which
resulted from a rapid deterioration of his heart and kidneys following
treatment of his wounds. One assignment of error questioned the
soundness of the court's ruling in excluding the testimony of a physi-
cian to the effect that the attending surgeons were negligent in treat-
ing the deceased and that the immediate cause of death was uremic
poisoning. The Supreme Court, finding "nothing... in the testimony
of this witness that would tend to exonerate the defendant from the
charge of murder,"8 overruled the assignment.
In so holding, the Court followed the rule established in this State,9
as elsewhere,10 that one inflicting a dangerous wound is held for the
consequences flowing from the injury whether the consequential harm
"be direct or through the operation of intermediate agencies dependent
to be malum prohibitum in Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W. 565
(1926). The usual tests to determine whether an act is malum in se or malum
prohibitum are listed in the Whitlock case as follows: "Malum in se is defined
as: 'An act involving illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon
principles of natural, moral and public law.' 38 C.J., P. 520." "Maluin pro-
hibitum is: 'An act made wrong by legislation; a forbidden evil.' 38 CJ., P.
520." 187 Tenn. at 526, 216 S.W.2d at 24. It is submitted that, if the court may
deprive the defendant of any defense he may have regarding causation or
intent by finding him to have been in the commission of an act malum in se,
is is desirable to have a much clearer definition of what an act malum in se
is than that set out above.
4. 155 Tenn. at 637, 299 S.W. at 805.
5. The Keller case appears in HALL AND GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 139 (1951); in HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 192 (3d ed. 1950) (generally considered the most widely
adopted Criminal Law casebook); and in MIKELL, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW
218 (3d ed. 1933).
6. 250 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1952).
7. 250 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1952).
8. Id. at 90.
9. Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 157 S.W. 419 (1913). See Rucker v. State,
174 Tenn. 569, 574, 129 S.W.2d 208, 210 (1939).
10. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (1934).
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upon and arising out of the original cause."" Perhaps the most com-
mon intermediate agency which a wrongdoer should foresee as the
result of an act like the one in the Gray case is a surgical operation.
The wrongdoer, therefore, takes the risk that the physicians may be
negligent and becomes criminally responsible for the death even
though competent treatment would have cured the deceased. The fact
that the immediate cause of death in the instant case was uremia
presented no problem since this ailment was a direct result of the
deceased's wounds.
12
False Pretenses: Two unusual false pretenses questions arose in
Ownbey v. State.13 There the defendant represented that he was X, a
man of good credit, and induced several retailers to sell merchandise
to him on conditional sale. The defense raised was that defendant was
acting on X's authority and that the goods were actually delivered to
X. The Court refused to disturb the jury's verdict of guilty,-pointing
out that a defrauder is no less guilty of false pretenses when the pre-
tense is made for the benefit of another.' 4
A second question, though not mentioned by the Court, is present
in this case. It stems from the requirement that, for there to be a
crime of false pretenses, the duped person must have intended to pass
title to the goods, not merely possession.5 But when goods are sold
on a conditional sale contract, title is expressly reserved in the seller.
Can it then be said that the conditional buyer has acquired a sufficient
property interest in the goods so as to be adjudged guilty of obtaining
property by false pretenses? The Court's holding is an implicit indi-
cation that .it felt the conditional buyer had acquired the necessary
property interest. What meager authority exists on the point is in ac-
cord with this view.'6 Since the conditional vendee becomes the bene-
ficial owner, leaving only a security interest in the vendor, such a view
seems sound.
Interpretation of Criminal Statutes: Mere possession or keeping of
slot machines is not a crime in Tennessee, 7 despite the wording of sec-
11. Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 69, 157 S.W. 419, 421 (1913).
12. In Rucker v. State, 174 Tenn. 569, 129 S.W.2d 208 (1939), the Court en-,
dorsed the rule of causation set out in the Odeneal case, but reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the evidence failed to show that the death of the
deceased was a consequence, direct or indirect, of the defendant's wrong.
13. 253 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1952).
14. Rowe v. State, 164 Tenn. 571, 51 S.W.2d 505 (1932) (defendant's con-
tention that a third party got the benefit of the money fraudulently obtained
held not an adequate defense); People v. Cheeley, 106 Cal. App.2d 748, 236
P.2d 22 (1951).
15. There are literally hundreds of cases stating this proposition in the
False Pretenses topic of the Decennial Digests, key number 12.
16. Chappell v. State, 216 Ind. 666, 25 N.E.2d 999 (1940); Whitmore v.
State, 238 Wis. 79, 298 N.W. 194, 134 A.L.R. 872 (1941).
17. Burks v. State, 254 S.W.2d 970 (Tenn. 1953). (Walden v. State is also
incorporated into this opinion.) In Cleek v. State, 189 Tenn. 302, 225 S.W.2d
1953 ]
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tion 11276: "If any person ... keep or exhibit any gaming table or
device for gaming he is also guilty of a misdemeanor."' 8 For there to
be a violation of the Tennessee statutes on the subject, the machines
must be used for gambling or for the enticement of persons to gamble.
This construction apparently permits the storage of gambling devices
in this State, so long as they are not actually in use.
Another interpretation problem was resolved when the Court held
that a dog is a domestic animal within the meaning of a statute making
it a crime willfully to kill a "domestic animal of another, of any
value.'
9
A test case resulted in a holding that the use of gill nets in Tennessee
by commercial fishermen is prohibited by the Code.
20
PROCEDURAL LAW
Searches and Seizures: Although the major pronouncements of the
Court during the past year on the subject of searches and seizures are
to be found elsewhere in this Survey,21 one further case, Garrett v.
State,22 deserves mention. The accused in that case first assailed the
search warrant on the ground that it contained an inadequate and in-
accurate description of the premises to be searched. Despite the Ten-
nessee Constitution's prohibition against "general warrants,"23 the
rule is established in this State that a description is sufficient if it en-
ables the officer to locate with reasonable certainty the place to be
searched.24 The Court reiterated this rule in finding this assignment
of error to be without merit.
The defendant further contended that the search was illegal because
the officers neither read nor exhibited the search warrant to him. The
70 (1949), the Court held that the mere possession of a gaming device in
defendant's residence was not a violation of the gaming statutes.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11276 (Williams 1934). In supporting the holding
of the Burks case, the Court relied on the wording of §§ 5250 and 11282,
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams 1934). Section 5250 provides: "Gambling Devices.
- No person shall have in his possession any gambling table or any device
whatever for enticement of any person to gamble." Section 11282 provides:
"Gaming device.- Any person convicted of having, or having had, in his pos-
session any gambling table or other device for the enticement of any person
to play or gamble.... ."
19. White v. State, 249 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1952). The statute construed is
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10865 (Williams 1934). The word "beast" formerly appeared
in the statute in lieu of "domestic animal." State v. Phillips, 1 Tenn. Cas. 34
(1850), held that a dog was not a beast within the meaning of Tenn. Acts
1803, c. 9, § 2.
20. Spicer v. State, 250 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1952). The Court reached this
result by reading §§ 5176.79 and 5176.83, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams Supp.
1952), in pari materia.
21. See the section on Evidence, subsection on Illegally Obtained Evidence, in
the article on Procedure and Evidence.
22. Garrett v. State, 250 S.W.2d 43 (Tenn. 1952).
23. TENN CONST. Art. I, § 7.
24. Webb v. State, 173 Tenn. 518, 121 S.W.2d 550 (1938); O'Brien v. State,
158 Tenn. 400, 14 S.W.2d 51 (1929); cf. Seals v. State, 157 Tenn. 538, 11 S.W.2d
879 (1928); Bragg v. State, 155 Tenn. 20, 290 S.W.1 (1927).
[ VOL. 61182
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Court summarily disposed of this objection by noting that there is no
statute in this State requiring an officer to exhibit the warrant at the
time of search. Since the opinion does not disclose whether a demand
to see the warrant was made or whether the search was resisted, the
decision is a difficult one to evaluate. Admittedly the officer need not
exhibit the warrant while the defendant actively resists the search;
25
nor perhaps need he do so if there is no demand on the part of the de-
fendant.26 But one wonders whether the Court intended its decision
to deny a peaceful party, offering no resistance to the search, the right
to see, upon reasonable demand, the authority by which his right to be
secure in his person and possessions is abridged. The only authority
cited by the Court in support of its holding is a passage from American
Jurisprudence stating that one need not exhibit a search warrant at the
time of the search.27 Examination of this passage shows that the single
case cited to uphold it was one in which a party "vigorously resisted"
arrest.28 It is usually said that upon demand an officer must exhibit a
warrant for arrest, even though no statute requires it.29 No reason for
a different rule with regard to search warrants is readily apparent.
Indictments and Presentments: A point of law frequently resolved
in other jurisdictions arose for the first time in the Tennessee state
courts in State v. Smith.30 One count of the presentment charged the
defendants with conspiring to violate a lawful injunction by doing at
least six different wrongful acts. The defendants demurred to the pre-
sentment on the ground that this count charged six separate and dis-
tinct crimes and was, therefore, duplicitous. The Supreme Court held
that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and remanded the
case for a new trial. In doing so, the Court followed what appears to
be the overwhelming weight of authority on the problem.3 ' This view
recognizes the fundamental proposition that the illegal agreement is
the criminal act in conspiracy. 32 Since the wrongful agreement con-
stitutes the act punishable by law, whether the object of that agree-
ment is to commit one crime or six crimes, the agreement itself
25. See State v. Brown, 91 W. Va. 709, 114 S.E. 372 (1922).
26. Ibid.
27. 47 AM. JuR., Searches and Seizures § 39 (1943).
28. State v. Brown, 91 W. Va. 709, 114 S.E. 372, 374 (1922).
29. Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REV. 509, 555 (1949).
30. 253 S.W.2d 992 (Tenn. 1952). The Tennessee decision most closely ap-
proximating the Smith case is Thompson v. State, 105 Tenn. 176, 58 S.W. 213,
51 L.R.A. 833 (1900), but there the Court seemed to believe that the crux of
the indictment was an unlawful attempt to do different criminal acts.
31. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 71 L. Ed.
793 (1927); United States v. Bogy, 16 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Tenn. 1936), af'd, 96
F.2d. 734 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 608 (1938); People v. Kahn, 256
Ill. App. 415 (1930). See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 Sup.
Ct. 99, 87 L. Ed. 23 (1942); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10,
39 Sup. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561 (1919). For a welter of cases on the question
of conspiracy to do a number of different acts, see Note, 87 L. Ed. 29 (1943).
32. MILLER, CRIINAL LAW 107 (1934).
1953 ] 1183
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
constitutes only one crime. Thus an allegation in a single count of a
conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous.
Former Jeopardy: It is usually held that an accused is in jeopardy
when, upon going to trial before a court of competent jurisdiction,
with valid indictment and plea, the jury is sworn to try the issue.33
However, an efficient administration of justice has required that ex-
ceptions be made to this rule, providing for such contingencies as the
illness or disqualification of jurors.34 Thus the cases have long held
that the trial judge may discharge the jury for the misconduct or dis-
qualification of one of its members whenever discharge is necessary
to ensure a proper trial and that such discharge will not support a
plea of former jeopardy when the defendant is tried again.
35 But
discharge of the jury, over the objection of the defendant, for mis-
conduct or disqualification not of such a serious nature as to render
the discharge necessary, is generally held to be a sufficient basis for a
plea of former jeopardy.36
In Helton v. State,37 the day after the jury was sworn to try the de-
fendant on a charge of first degree murder, the trial judge was in-
formed by the district attorney general that Mr. Parker, one of the
jurors, was infamous. After Parker admitted that he had been con-
victed of petit larceny some 25 years before, the judge excused him and
ordered a new juror selected. On the third day of the trial, the at-
torney general questioned the qualifications of another juror, Mr.
Brooks. Testimony was heard that Brooks had been friendly with the
defendant; furthermore, an affidavit by Brook's divorced wife alleged
that he was heard to say that he did not think Helton would "get a
day" for the killing. The court then decided that the different chal-
lenges made to the qualifications of the jurors had created some mis-
apprehension on the part of the other jurors and that this, together
with Brook's statement and apparently friendly relationship to the
defendant, necessitated a new jury. A mistrial was ordered.
The discharge of the first juror, Parker, seems to have been improper
for the reason that infamy of a juror is a cause propter defectum - that
33. Etter v. State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S.W.2d 1 (1947); Green v. State, 147
Tenn. 299, 247 S.W. 84 (1923); MILLER, CRIVMqAL LAW 535 (1934).
34. MI LER, CRImNAL LAW 536-40 (1934).
35. "The general modern rule is that the court may discharge a juror with-
out working an acquittal of the defendant in any case, where the ends of
justice, under the circumstances, would otherwise be defeated." Green v. State,
147 Tenn. 299, 307, 247 S.W. 84, 86 (1922). Thompson v. United States, 155
U.S. 271, 15 Sup. Ct. 73, 39 L. Ed. 146 (1894); Simmons v. United States, 142
U.S. 148, 12 Sup. Ct. 171, 35 L. Ed. 968 (1891). This principle of law is found
in Tennessee cases ranging in point of time from Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn.
532 (1837), through Etter v. State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S.W.2d 1 (1947).
36. Tomassbn v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W. 802 (1903); State v. Connor, 45
Tenn. 311 (1868); Ward v." State, 20 Tenn. 253 (1839); State v. Thompson,
58 Utah 291, 199 Pac. 161 (1921).
37. 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
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is, a defect which is not open to attack after the juror is sworn in.38
On the other hand, the discharge of the second juror for prejudging
the case is supported by the authorities. 39 However, the ground was
abruptly cut from under the defendant's contention that the improper
discharge of the first juror gave rise to double jeopardy when the Su-
preme Court overruled this assignment of error, apparently on the
ground that the bill of exceptions did not show an exception to the trial
court's ruling on this point.40 The Court then affirmed the ruling that
the second juror was properly discharged because of manifest neces-
sity and upheld the conviction.
By relying on the omission in the bill of exceptions to negative the
defendant's plea of former jeopardy with reference to the first juror,
the Court avoided coming to grips with a problem as difficult as it is
unusual. This is, does the later ordering of a mistrial for proper dis-
qualification of a juror remove the former jeopardy objection on the
part of the defendant with regard to the previous improper discharge
of another juror? There are arguments of some weight on both sides of
the problem. It is possible that a court might meet the somewhat tech-
nical argument of former jeopardy with the view that, since the jury
was invalid all the while by reason of the presence of a juror who had
prejudged the case, the defendant was not'injured by the previous in-
correct ruling. The defendant might well come back with the con-
tention that, after the discharge of the first juror, the old jury came
to an end, and despite the fact that the new jury had eleven of the
same jurors it is actually a new and distinct body from the first jury.
41
In Littleton v. State,42 the defendant requested at his first trial that
38. "It is conceded by the state that a number of cases do hold that the
infamy of a juror is properly a cause of propter defectum." Id. at 697. Ten-
nessee cases have held the following causes of disqualification propter de-
fectum: relationship of juror to defendant and nonresidency in the county,
Tomasson v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W. 802 (1903); juror related to prosecu-
tor, Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 S.W. 695 (1898); relationship of
juror to defendant, Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620 (1883); juror not land-
owner in the county, Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246 (1874); jurors not free-
holders, Ward v. State, 20 Tenn. 253 (1839). It would seem that infamy would
fit into this class of cases. Section 10009, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams 1934),
renders those persons who are infamous incompetent to serve as jurors; but
nonhouseholders were, at the time the cases cited above were decided, also
prohibited by statute, § 10006, as are persons related within the sixth degree
at the present time, § 10007.
39. Three Tennessee cases distinguish causes propter defectum from those
where a juror has "prejudged" the case and indicate that in the latter case
the juror can be discharged without giving rise to double jeopardy on a new
trial. See Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 418, 419, 47 S.W. 695, 696 (1898); Cart-
wright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620, 628 (1883); Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246, 253
(1874).
40. See the section on Appeal and Error in the article on Procedure and
Evidence in this Survey for a critical comment on this ruling.
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8814 (Williams 1934) allows a juror to be discharged
under certain circumstances and says "the vacancy may be filled and the
trial commenced anew, or the court may, in its discretion, order the jury to be
discharged and a new one impaneled."
42. 249 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1952).
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the jury fix the punishment. The jury found the defendant guilty but
was unable to fix the punishment. On retrial, the plea of autrefois
convict was properly overruled for the reason that there had been no
complete verdict in the first case until the jury had both found the
defendant guilty and agreed upon the punishment.
Joinder: In Dykes v. State,43 three men were separately indicted for
the felonious transportation of whiskey, the acts of each arising out
of the same transaction. The trial judge overruled the defendants'
motion for separate trials and consolidated the cases for trial. The de-
fendants assigned this as error on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's ruling.
Whether defendants may be jointly tried or are entitled to a sever-
ance lies in a large measure within the discretion of the trial court.
4
Where different defendants are jointly indicted, the trial judge may in
his discretion refuse their application for separate trials, unless a joint
trial would unduly prejudice the rights of the defendants. 4 5 Or, where
a single defendant is charged in separate indictments with different
offenses growing out of the same transaction, a consolidation of the in-
dictments for trial is properly within the judge's discretion. 46 But the
Dykes case falls in neither of these well-established categories, for it
is a case in which different defendants were separately indicted for of-
fenses arising from the same transaction. Should the ordering of a
joint trial in this case lie within the judge's discretion? Although the
Court's holding that this, too, is discretionary with the trial court has
little direct authority to support it, 47 it has the distinct advantage of
having virtually no authority against it. 4 8 It would seem in the best
interests of a speedy and economical administration of justice to allow
the trial judge, to order a joint trial in a situation like the Dykes case,
if in his discretion he finds that such a consolidation will not result in
prejudice to the defendants.
43. 253 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1952).
44. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 171 Tenn. 156, 101 S.W.2d 467 (1937);
People v. Eudy, 12 Cal.2d 41, 82 P.2d 359 (1938); State v. Blackley, 191 Wash.
23, 70 P.2d 799 (1937); see Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 538-39, 51 S.W.2d
843, 845 (1932). ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 316
(1947).
45. Thompson v. State, 171 Tenn. 156, 101 S.W.2d 467 (1937).
46. People v. Duane, 21 Cal.2d 71, 130 P.2d 123 (1942); People v. Kittrelle,
102 Cal. App.2d 149, 227 P.2d 38 (1951); People v. Gryszkiewicz, 88 Cal. App.2d
230, 198 P.2d 585 (1948).
47. There is some federal authority which seems to allow the trial court
this discretion, but these holdings are at least partially based upon a statute.
Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1926), is probably the strongest
holding on the point. This case contended that a trial judge has the discretion-
ary power to compel a joinder in the Dykes situation even without statutory
authority. Id. at 729. But this statement hardly seems necessary to the actual
holding of the Morris case.
48. The Court in the Dykes case noted that the defense counsel was unable to
find a single case to support his position.
1186 [ VOL. 6
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Juries: In comparison with her neighboring states, Tennessee has
had an unusually tranquil history with regard to racial discrimination
in the selection of grand and petit jurors. While a great many cases
on this subject have found their way into the appellate courts of the
other Southern states, the Tennessee courts have entertained only a
handful of proceedings of this nature.49 The most recent holding on
the subject, Williamson v. State,50 arose out of the shooting of a deputy
sheriff engaged in an ill-timed attempt to make an arrest during a
colored picnic.
In appealing from a first degree murder conviction, the defendant
contended that there was discrimination against the colored race in
the manner in which the panel was selected and that Negroes should
be represented on juries in the same proportion that the Negroes
bear to the whites in the county. The record showed that the trial
jury consisted of eleven whites and one Negro chosen from a panel
containing 18 to 20 Negroes out of a total of 152 panel members. The
testimony of one of the jury commissioners on the subject was as
follows:
"Q. Have you endeavored to select the same number of colored folks
in proportion to the population as there are to the whites on the jury?
A. We never made any selection of so many colored people and so many
of the white people we just put a good many names of the colored people in
there and a good many names of white people.
"Q. Well in order to get the colored names in there you checked on
certain colored folks in order to locate that-see whether or not you knew
a colored man that would make a good juror and such as that, that's the
method you used? A. That's right because the majority of colored people
are not, I don' [sic] think, qualified for jury service."51
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Since 1880 it has been repeatedly held that state discrimination
against Negroes with respect to service on grand and petit juries solely
because of their race denies Negro defendants in criminal cases the
equal protection of laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
5 2
49. In two of the older cases, Rivers v. State, 117 Tenn. 235, 96 S.W. 956
(1906), and Ransom v. State, 116 Tenn. 355, 96 S.W. 953 (1905), the Court
was astute to decide the controversies on procedural technicalities without
facing the merits of whether there was illegal segregation. In a more recent
case, Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310, 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), the Court did
go into the merits of jury selection in Maury County and found there to be no
illegal discrimination. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
50. 250 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1952). Neither this decision nor the Kennedy
case, supra note 49, cited the Rivers or Ransom case, supra note 49.
51. 250 S.W.2d at 558.
52. The cases do not seem to distinguish between the constitutional rights in-
volved with respect to grand juries and petit juries. The numerous cases
supporting the text range from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25
L. Ed. 664 (1879), through Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L.




Such discrimination is invalid whether embodied in a statute or car-
ried on in the administrative practices of state jury selection.53 The
constitutional right involved appears to be negative in nature. There
is no affirmative right on the part of a colored defendant to have
Negroes on the jury. His only right is that there be no systematic
discrimination against Negroes in the selection of juries.
54
The most troublesome problem in this area is the very one raised
in the Williamson case. That is, what acts constitute discrimination
in selecting juries and jury panels? The commissioner in the William-
son case said that he limited the number of Negroes on jury panels
because he believed that few of them made good jurors. It is true
that Negroes can be excluded from jury duty because of incompetency
like anyone else,55 but they cannot be excluded solely because of
their race. In cases like Williamson v. State, which reason is really
uppermost in a jury commissioner's mind? Does he limit the number
of Negroes on the panel because they are Negroes or because they
are not qualified to serve?
It is doubtful if complete exclusion over a period of time of Negroes
from jury panels on the ground that the commissioners knew of none
qualified to serve would be tolerated.56 The inference would probably
be drawn that they were excluded primarily because of their race. It
may be possible over a relatively short period of time unofficially to
limit the number of Negroes on each panel if the stated reason for the
low Negro participation is that the commissioners were unable to find
any more colored people capable of being good jurors.57 This is so
53. The Strauder case, supra note 52, involved a statute. The other cases,
such as the Cassell and Shepherd cases, supra note 52, Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed. 76 (1947), and Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 1692 (1945), involved administrative
discrimination.
54. See Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310, 317, 210 S.W.2d 132, 135 (1947), for
a typical statement of this proposition.
55. "It rests with each State to prescribe such qualifications as it deems
proper for jurymen, taking care only that no discrimination in respect to such
service, be made against any class of citizens solely because of their race."
In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291, 297-98, 11 Sup. Ct. 770, 35 L. Ed. 510
(1891). For cases where Negroes were to some extent excluded because they
were not qualified, see note 57, infra. The Tennessee requirements for jury
service are found in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10006-10014 (Williams 1934, Supp.
1952).
56. In Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942),
the defendant charged that Negroes had been systematically excluded from
juries in Dallas County. Evidence was introduced which showed no Negro
had served on a grand jury for many years in that county. The jury com-
missioners insisted that they did not exclude Negroes because of their race,
rather because they chose only people they knew to be qualified to serve
and they were not acquainted with any Negroes whom they considered quali-
fied. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, held that the evidence showed
there were plenty of qualified colored people in the area and that the com-
missioners were under a duty to go out and familiarize themselves with these
people.
57. A number of pre-1940 state decisions allowed either exclusion of
Negroes or a very limited participation by them in juries and panels largely
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for the simple reason that in a state like Tennessee, where officials
have a great deal of discretion in selecting jury panels, it is almost
impossible to prove a discriminatory limitation against Negroes, be-
cause officials can testify that in their discretion they thought the
persons chosen for jury duty were the best qualified.58 However,
even here, if there is a pattern of limitation over a period of years and
a showing that the jury commissioners choose only those Negroes
whom they know without familiarizing themselves with other possible
qualified Negroes in the community, a recent case, Cassell v. Texas,59
indicates that the United States Supreme Court might find an illegal
discrimination.
The defendant's insistence in the Williamson case that he was en-
titled to a jury on which Negroes were represented in the same pro-
portion that the population of their race bears to the total population
of the community involved was properly rejected by the Court. The
Supreme Court of the United States has said: "Fairness in selection
[of a jury] has never been held to require proportional representation
of races on a jury."60 In fact, the cases go so far as to assert that an
important portion of a Negro defendant's rights is to have members
of his own race considered for jury duty without numerical or pro-
portional limitations.
61
Extradition: The recently adopted Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act 62 came under construction in State ex rel. Hourigan v. Robinson.63
This was a habeas corpus proceeding for the release of the relator from
custody under a rendition warrant issued by the Governor of Ten-
on the word of jury commissioners that they were unable to find many colored
people qualified for jury service. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157
S.W. 330 (1913); Bruster v. State, 40 Okla. Crim. 25, 266 Pac. 486 (1928);
Langrum v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 23, 78 S.W.2d 973 (1935); Ross v. State, 7
S.W.2d 1078 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928); State v. Cook, 81 W. Va. 686, 95 S.E. 792
(1918).
58. For a discussion of this and related probleniis, see Scott, The Supreme
Court's Control over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IowA L. REv. 577,
597 (1949).
59. 339 U.S. 282, 70 Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 839 (1950). In this case, there
had been a pattern of limiting the number of Negroes on grand juries to one
on 16 of the last 21 juries and none on the other five. On the jury which in-
dicted the defendant, there had been no Negroes. The jury commissioners
testified that it was very difficult to find a colored person qualified to serve
as a juror whose occupation did not preclude his serving. The Court assumed
that a large percentage of the colored population of Dallas County met the
statutory requirements and held that the commissioners here had failed to
familiarize themselves adequately with those people. The Court overturned
a conviction of murder on that basis. For a discussion of this case, see Sanders,
Criminal Law Administration Prior to Trial: Recent Constitutional Develop-
ments, 4 VA~N. L. REv. 766, 787 (1951).
60. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945).
61. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287, 70 Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 839
(1950).
62. The Act was passed in 1951 and is found in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11935.1 -
11935.26 (Williams Supp. 1952). Thirty-nine states have now adopted the
Act, 9 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1952).
63. 257 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1953).
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nessee for the relator's extradition to Kentucky. The rendition war-
rant of the Governor was attacked on the grounds that it was
defective in authorizing a Kentucky sheriff to make the arrest instead
of a Tennessee official, but the Court found this no ground for re-
leasing the relator from custody.64 The Court said: "Regardless of
who arrested the relator he was properly before the trial judge on
his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. 65
Reduction of Imprisonment and Parole: An important clarification
of the Tennessee statutes on reduction of imprisonment for good be-
havior resulted from State. ex rel. Jackson v. Brown.6 6 There Dr.
Jackson had been sentenced to one to three years for abortion. After
taking him into custody, prison officials set up as a credit to his
sentence six month's "good time"67 and six months "honor grade"
time.68 After serving half of the remaining 24 months, Dr. Jackson
became eligible for, and was granted, a parole. Within a year, the
parolee was indicted for abortion allegedly committed while he was
on parole. The Board of Paroles revoked his parole and undertook
to take from him his six months honor grade time. The State, al-
though conceding that the Board had no power to take from the
prisoner his good time, successfully urged before the Supreme Court
that the honor time must be restored to his sentence. The Supreme
Court held that the 1943 amendment 69 to section 12209.270 invalidated
the granting of honor grade time in Tennessee; hence, the grant of
honor time to Dr. Jackson was a nullity, and the six months were
still a part of his sentence and must be served.
Legislation providing reduced time credit for good behavior has
been in force in Tennessee since 1870. 71 A 1931 version of it set up the
honor grade and provided:
"So long as any prisoner who is placed in the 'honor grade' remains
therein, he shall, in addition to the good time allowed by this act have
deducted from the time for which he may have been sentenced two
months for each year of his term of imprisonment, or the fractional part
thereof."72
64. The defendant's contention that the arrest must be made by Tennessee
officers is based on § 7 of the Uniform Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 11935.7 (Wil-
liams Supp. 1952), which simply provides that a governor may sign a warrant
and direct it to "a sheriff, marshal, coroner, or other person whom he may
think fit to entrust with the execution thereof...
65. 257 S.W.2d at 11.
66. 256 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1953).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12209.1 (Williams 1934) allows credits for good be-
havior to the extent of deductions of one month from the first year, two
months from the second year, three months from the third through ninth year
and four months from each remaining year. This is called "good time."
68. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12209.2 (Williams 1934) allows a two-month per year
deduction for those prisoners in "honor grade."
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12209.2 (Williams Supp. 1952).
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12209.2 (Williams 1934).
71. Tenn. Acts 1870, c. 59.
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12209.2 (Williams 1934).
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The 1943 amendment contained provisions establishing the honor
grade and taking away honor time for misbehavior, but .entirely
omitted the paragraph quoted above. The Court apparently relied on
this omission as the basis of their decision abrogating honor time.
Either through misinterpretation of the 1943 amendment or lack of
knowledge of this significant omission, prison officials had continued to
grant honor grade time until the Jackson case. The embarra.sment.to
,prison authorities and the grief to the prisoners themselves, occasioned
by this decision were soon ended by the passage of a public act by the
1953 Legislature empowering the Commissioner of Institutions to allow
honor time once more.
7 3
Another statute which came before the Court for interpretation was
section 11802.1,74 which authorizes trial judges to parole defendalots
"convicted of a misdemeanor or convicted of any felony, the maximum
punishment for which does not exceed five years' confinement in the
state penitentiary.... " In State v. Croft,75 the defendant was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter; his punishment was fixed by the jury at
confinement in the penitentiary for not more than three years. The
defendant filed a petition for parole which the trial judge granted in
the belief that the "maximum punishment" referred to in section
11802.1 meant the maximum fixed by the jury rather than that allowed
by law for the offense committed -ten years in the case of voluntary
manslaughter. On petition for certiorari by the State seeking an ad-
judication avoiding the parole order, the Supreme Court held that
the authority of the trial judge to parole is determined by the maxi-
mum punishment enumerated by the statute.7 6 It would seem clear
that the legislative intent was to withhold the power of parole from
the trial judge when the offense is a major felony and that a rational
classification of major and petit felonies must rest on the seriousness
attached to each by the legislature as reflected by the statutory maxi-
mum punishment affixed to each crime.
Another interpretation of the Code sections7 7 regulating parole and
suspension of sentence by the trial judge resulted from Arney v.
State.78 There it was held that the trial judge himself can initiate the
procedure for revoking a suspended sentence without having his
attention called to the alleged violation by the district attorney general
or a third party.
73. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 164.
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11802.1 (Williams 1934).
75. 253 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1952).
76. A quotation from Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 81, 299 S.W. 1049, 1052
(1927), which says, "When the jury fixed a definite period, that became the
maximum time for which the defendant could be imprisoned," is not good
authority for a view contrary to that taken by the Court. In the Letner case,
the Court was dealing only with the question of when the defendant became
subject to parole under the indeterminate sentence law.
77. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11802.1-11802.3 (Williams Supp. 1952).




A number of acts authorized increases in the penalties of various
crimes. These offenses were burglary in the second 9 and third de-
grees,80 robbery,81 usury,8 2 setting forest fires,83 jailbreaking84 and
driving while under the influence of intoxicants. 85 This latter offense is
now punishable by a mandatory 60 days to 11 months and 29 days jail
sentence. The so-called "bad check" law has been ameliorated some-
what by allowing the maker of the check 10 days' notice to make pay-
ment instead of the previous three days' notice.86 Possession of barbithl
without written prescription was made a misdemeanor.7 Immunity
from prosecution was granted to all members of the Armed Forces of
the United States who have been tried by a military court martial
and either convicted or acquitted.8
79. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 63.
80. Id., c. 65.
81. Id., c. 66.
82. Id., c. 67.
83. Id., c. 143.
84. Id., c. 68.
85. Id., c. 202.
86. Id., c. 64. This amends TENN. CODE ANN. § 11157 (Williams 1934).
87. Id., c. 52.
88. Id., c. 108.
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